RIM Report 2012/2013

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Accurate counts are critical for the management of rhino (and other large mammals) in the KNP and sufficient budget will need to be found to permit for an annual helicopter based count to be implemented – at least until the poaching threat abates. ).

Listen up, SanParks!

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Why would the actual holder of the horn not want the very same thing
and just keep it and sell it illegally at a higher price or wait for legalized
international trade...

Because he lacks the criminal background organization to sell it illegally

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Download the RIM report

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SECTION TWO- SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE RHINOCEROS
4. RHINO SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES
4.1 Threats to Species Persistence
Various threats to the conservation and persistence of the white and black rhino in South Africa have been identified. Range restriction or attrition, natural mortality and low birth rates are among those which occur on a normative basis and which are currently being managed. The future of the rhino will depend on whether the species can grow at target rates, in a variety of ranges in the wild, and in ensuring that the net growth rate is in the order of a minimum of five per cent per annum (Emslie, R., & Knight, M., 2012). The threat offered by current significant increases in the levels of poaching of rhino places serious pressure on the ability of the rhino to sustain favourable net growth rates. It is estimated that the number of live births still exceeds the number of deaths at between 6.5 - 6.9 per cent (Emslie, 2012) population growth -net of deaths- from 1995 to 2011.
In 2012, South African rhino were being poached in all nine provinces and extensively in the Kruger National Park (KNP). By December 19th, 2012, 633 rhinos had been poached with the highest number of incidents occurring in the KNP (395). Over 200 arrests have been made to date. The poaching operation incorporates people at various levels, ranging from the poacher on the ground in the area, who is often a member of a local community and/or working for the reserve, through to the international receiver/buyer who sits at the top of the poaching chain. Most arrests that are made involve the poacher on the ground in the area. There is clear evidence of highly organized international and national crime syndicates dominating poaching activities and of neighbouring countries – especially Mozambique- being used as bases for strikes into South Africa. This requires collaboration in fighting poaching at the local, provincial, national, regional and international levels in order to apprehend criminals and stop poaching (Mapanye & Chipu, 2012). The threat of poaching increases with proximity to national borders (Emslie & Brooks, 1999) hence the proportionally higher impact on the KNP.

4.2 Rhino Poaching
2.4 per cent of the South African white rhino population was poached for horn in 2011, with the rate of poaching increasing exponentially from 0.03 rhinos
per day prior to 2007 to 1.23 rhinos per day in 2011 (Ferreira, Pfab & Knight, 2012) and a current 1.50 rhinos per day as of October 2012 (DEA, 2012).

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5. SAFETY AND SECURITY OPTIONS
5.1 Current Interventions
There is a national strategy for the safety and security of Rhino in place in South Africa which outlines the requirements for rhino protection. NATJOINTS, a South African National coordinating security body, has initiated Operation Rhino and is working to reduce the incidence of successful poaching of rhino in South Africa. Priority committees working on rhino protection have been established in the provinces, and coordinators appointed, under the instruction of NATJOINTS. Dedicated investigation teams have been set up in each province and dedicated prosecutors have been appointed. Information is reported to the central Priority Crime Knowledge Management Centre and the enforcement of environmental legislation pertaining to the rhino has been integrated into the Rural Safety Management Plan (RSMP). Tracker dogs and handlers are being deployed as well as visible air patrols with increased reaction capability (Mapanye & Chipu, 2012). SARS Tax and Customs Enforcement Investigations (TCEI) division is implementing a number of projects to ensure that rhino products are not illegally exported from South Africa and is required in terms of South Africa’s international agreements to work closely with the International Consortium for Controlled Deliveries in Wildlife Crime (ICCWC). In particular, pseudo-hunting was a major focus of investigation which has largely been addressed via new regulations. Rhino horn is additionally used for purposes of money laundering and racketeering (HAWKS, 2012).
Operation Worthy was conducted by all Interpol countries with the aim to curb rhino horn smuggling. In South Africa a combined effort from The Hawks, Interpol, National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit, Department of Environmental Affairs, National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), NATJOINTS and SARS was conducted. Inspections were conducted at taxidermists, freight agencies,airports, borders, game farms and road blocks were held at key areas and searches were conducted (HAWKS, 2012). This resulted in the gathering of critical information and led to a number of arrests and convictions (SAPS, 2012).
Security checks are now run on all operational personnel working with rhino and security partnerships have been initiated inter alia with the veterinary profession, private rhino owners, farmers, civil aviation participants, and NGOs. The development of a shared rhino safety and security strategy is underway with the Defence Force Chiefs of neighbouring countries. Work at the wider international level is ongoing with Interpol and the NWCRI (Mapanye & Chipu, 2012). The National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit (NWCRU) was established and a number of provincial and local initiatives are underway in State owned areas.
Various legislation is being brought to bear to support protection efforts, to wit; the National Biodiversity Environmental Act 10/2004; the Provincial Biodiversity Environmental Acts and Ordinances; the Civil Aviation Act; the Protected Areas Act (Act no 57 of 2003); the Firearms and Ammunition Act; all fraud and corruption related legislation and regulation; the Drug and Drug Trafficking Act; Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) and Minimum Information Security Standards. Amendments to the norms and standards for the marking of rhinoceros horn and hunting of white rhinoceros for trophy hunting purposes were published in the government gazette in April 2012 and have since been implemented. The amendments have strengthened provisions relating to marking, the supervision of hunts, the transport of the horn subsequent to the hunt, reporting and monitoring, verification of hunters, and the taking of samples for DNA profiling, and have largely reduced the threats from pseudohunting.
While it is clear that rhino poaching has increased (Thomas, 2010), so too has the focus and activities of the South African security forces in attempts to protect the rhino. Even so, poaching levels are inexorably rising to the detriment of the species and it can only be speculated what the levels of poached rhino might have been if additional measures had not been deployed. However, more resources are needed and agreements and strategies with neighbouring countries will be essential.

5.2 Intelligence
South Africa’s focus up to now has largely been on reactive strategies, where there have been extensive attempts to focus on escalating rhino poaching. However, it will be significantly more constructive if poachers can be halted before they get anywhere near rhinos. This will only come about through an increased focus on improved intelligence collection, its analysis and the resultant implementation of strategically focused activities. Moreover, a focus on prevention rather than ex post facto apprehension will allow the state and private sector to direct limited resources into areas that can have the most impact.
The analysis of intelligence should be undertaken by skilled intelligence data analysts, with information being fed back to the source institutions as part of the shared approach to information. This kind of effective coordination is a vital element of South African anti-poaching strategy going forward. Intelligence feeding into this national database would include that collected from poached animals, information on syndicates and rhino horn markets.
The development of useful preventative intelligence will require greater cooperation internationally. The current problems with the leaky Mozambique border and poor legal deterrents in Mozambique are providing the poaching syndicates the opportunities to operate freely and without fear.

5.3 Dehorning
The horn of a rhino grows approximately 5 centimetres annually and can be harvested safely as long as the procedure is undertaken properly (Emslie, 2012; Ferreira, 2012; Knight 2012). Micro-chipping and DNA sampling can be implemented at the time of de-horning. The horn is made of keratin, the same substance which forms human hair and nails.
A rhino uses its horns for territory defense, self-defense, dominance assertion through sparring, cows defending calves, mating and foraging. Black rhino use the anterior horn to pull high branches down to feed on. Rhino horns sometimes break in the wild but do grow back. Dehorning is unlikely to have negative long-term effects but it will be important to ensure that all male rhino are dehorned at the same time, as a dehorned rhino will be at a considerable disadvantage in fighting (Ferreira, 2012).
Dehorning offers some defense against poaching but exposes the animal to some risk as it has to be chemically immobilized, and must be repeated on a regular basis as the horn grows. Humane dehorning, which ensures that the germinal layer is not damaged, leaves the base section intact for further growth. This base could weigh as much as a kilogram and at current prices still be attractive to poachers, thus still exposing the animal to a poaching threat. Poachers also kill dehorned rhinos to ensure they do not track the animal again, although notching of the feet (Lindsay & Taylor, 2011), which indicates in the spoor that the rhino being tracked is dehorned, can be a useful mechanism to deter this. When poachers operate at night they cannot see if the rhino has a horn or not and may simply shoot.
The numbers of rhino to be dehorned in South Africa poses a logistical and budgetary challenge especially for the larger wide-spread populations such as in the KNP or in uMfolozi Park. Each rhino has to be chemically immobilized and then dehorned and in some regions this requires helicopter darting due to the terrain. The darting, dehorning, micro-chipping and DNA sampling process takes between 30 minutes to one hour and costs approximately R8000/rhino after which blood and horn samples are sent to the national database for registration. Once the rhino has been dehorned, this procedure will need to be repeated every two to three years. Mortality from chemical capture is low at around one per cent.
To dehorn 10,000 rhino at a rate of eight rhino per day, will take approximately 1 000 days, and cost in the region of R84 million in 2012 ZAR (RIM calculations, 2012). The outcome of dehorning is a reduction in perceived value and stockpiled rhino horn given that trade is illegal currently. If kept in secure locations, protection for the stockpiles can be undertaken cost effectively (Milledge, 2004).
Dehorning has been used as a strategy in Namibia and extensively in Zimbabwe where complete dehorning is preferred for small populations and strategic dehorning for larger populations. In South Africa, dehorning takes place in the private sector reserves and in Mpumalanga, but has not yet been used inSANParks or any other provincial reserve except for specific management purposes. In Namibia, post dehorning, not a single dehorned rhino was poached and in Mozambique, no dehorned rhinos have been killed. In Zimbabwe, dehorning coupled with translocation is believed to have significantly reduced poaching (Lindsay & Taylor, 2011) and in the Zimbabwean Lowveld Conservancies dehorned rhino have a 29.1 percent higher chance of survival than horned rhino (du Toit, 2011). Dehorning interventions work best in conjunction with other protective safety and security measures (Lindsay & Taylor, 2011).
Where dehorning has taken place without adequate security in place however, results have not been good. In Zimbabwe, in spite of complete dehorning in certain areas extensive poaching has continued and in some areas, entire populations have been wiped out (Lindsay & Taylor, 2011)

5.4 Chemically Treating or Poisoning of Horn
The option of treating horn so as to render it unacceptable to consumers was raised by some stakeholders. Rhino horn was chemically treated in South Africa on a reserve in the Western Cape in early 2012 to protect against poaching. Three substances were injected simultaneously. The first is a dye which appears on the inside of the horn making it useless for decorative purposes. The second is a substance which makes the horn visible on an X-ray scanner, thus rendering the horn more difficult to smuggle out even in powder form and the third is Barium, which makes anyone who ingests it, ill. A concomitant communications campaign informing the public and potential poachers that the horn has been treated would be an essential component of such a strategy. Other chemical and toxic solutions such as ectoparasiticides are available, which have the dual effect of keep parasites away from the horn but which cause convulsions and severe headaches in humans. However, highly toxic substances, which would not harm rhino but which could seriously damage or kill humans are likely to be deemed illegal. Botox has been suggested as a possible toxin to protect horns.

5.5 Translocation
Rhino can be translocated to other areas either in groups or as individuals for the purposes of protection against poaching and to improve chances of survival and protection (Emslie & Brooks, 1999). In many cases, outliers (small populations of rhino or individuals which range in isolated areas) in larger parks are often prime candidates for translocation. Where the terrain or other factors make it impossible to properly protect animals these too can be translocated. Translocation offers the prospect to place rhinos in numerous secure locations thus rendering a greater measure of security provided protection is offered.

5.6 Community Participation
Participation in rhino poaching activities within communities is largely driven by extreme poverty (Loibooki, Hofer, Campbell, & East, 2009) and lack of access to economic opportunity (Anti-Poaching Intelligence Group, 2012). Leaky borders and large number of illegal immigrants exacerbate the situation and poachers are recruited from amongst these, as well as from exfreedom fighters from various neighbouring states. Such people are targets for international crime syndicates.
Formal training of community members where the community borders on or is part of the Park as rhino scouts has been suggested as an option and has already been implemented in Kenya with some success (Ferreira & OkitaOuma, 2012) and is being implemented in some of the reserves on the KNPs western border. The involvement of communities is supported by the World Wildlife Fund of South Africa (WWF-SA) which recommends working with communities living close to rhinos to create buffer zones and to become “the first line of defence” against poaching (WWF-SA, 2012). Various models of counter-poaching such as that provided to RIM by Ntomeni Ranger Services, the International Anti-Poaching Foundation (IAPF) and supported by the Black Rhino Management Biodiversity Plan (Knight, 2011), have been mooted. The draft White Rhino Biodiversity Management Plan (Emslie, 2012) emphasises the importance of working with communities in rhino areas to gather information on an ongoing basis, to identify threats and to support anti-poaching activities.
All models emphasise the need for good training and remuneration.
Involving communities in rhino horn farming with the scientific and technical assistance of the government Parks personnel partly as a security strategy is an option for consideration and is being requested by some communities such as the Balepye community4 which is calling for the removal of white rhino from Appendix ll of CITES and the introduction of legal trade.

5.7 Physical, Mechanical and Technology Options
DNA profiling of all rhino and micro-chipping of all horn and the maintenance of a centralised data base (RhODIS) are specific initiatives currently attempting to provide a baseline of information to be used for various monitoring purposes but which can also be used for forensic purposes to assist in rhino poachingvestigations. It can be used to track rhino movements as well as to ensure legal hunting through a centralised permitting system.
Cyber tracking of rhino is possible using specific technology from a central control room located in areas of vulnerability (IAPF, 2012) while GPS and digital communications systems as well as the use of drones are potential mechanisms to increase protection and reduce poaching. The type of drone recommended is a rotor-blade unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which is silent and which operates as part of an extra-sensory ecosystem. They have application in perimeter monitoring, patrol supplementation and animal monitoring, and offer real-time reporting, population studies, fire watch and aerial photography capabilities
The use of technology to reduce poaching should occur in combination with basic ranger work (well trained & suitably equipped) and in particular the development of communities as anti-poaching rangers. The community training should be based upon a well-focussed and implemented National Qualifications Framework (NQF) qualifications system where training and education occurs on an ongoing basis (IAPF, 2012). Most conservationists estimate there is a need for one ranger per 10 km (Knight, 2011).
Increased gate security and improved fencing and improved border security an all provide basic barrier methods which if well implemented, will contribute to better rhino security.

5.8 Farming
The IUCN African Rhinos Specialist Group (AfRSG) suggests three categories of rhino (Leader-Williams et al., 1997), wild, semi-wild and captive. Wild rhino
move in large areas normally while semi-wild rhino live and breed in smaller areas at a compressed density and require partial food supplementation.
Captive rhino occur in much smaller areas, breeding is manipulated and they are fully husbanded with a total reliance upon food provision.
Captive populations act as a “safety net” should the depredations of poachers be successful in reducing wild rhino number to dangerously low levels (Emslie
& Brooks, 1999) although high mortality rates and low reproductive rates can hamper speedy growth of captive populations. Some local rhino owners have
however succeeded in achieving breeding growth rates of six per cent per annum. Looking after captive rhino can be more expensive than managing rhino in the wild (Leader-Williams et al., 1997). The captive keeping and breeding of rhino would involve captive populations being bred primarily for horn and husbanded in the same way as other animals which are bred and kept primarily for harvesting purposes.
Farming of Rhino has been mooted by many as a way of preventing poaching by providing farmed horn to mvaeet demand, thus removing pressure on
wild key and important populations. Captive breeding science and expertise would be needed to ensure proper habitat, handling, and good breeding rates. Black rhino have better breeding rates in captivity but higher mortality rates (Emslie & Brooks, 1999). Rhino farming is non-lethal in that horn can be harvested annually without damaging or killing the rhino and since rhino have a life span of between 35 and 50 years, rhino horn farming is likely to be a sound economic proposition. Trade partners will be needed as part of a strategy to re-introduce international trade, with China, Malaysia and Viet Nam suggested by stakeholders as possible options.
Some stakeholders argue that farmers are likely to breed rhino over time to produce an animal which is genetically selected for horn size thus changing the nature of the species. Others note that if this were to be the case, the parallel is similar to that of domestic cattle and wild buffalo where both exist for different purposes. The genetic integrity of the wild rhino will not be compromised as long as the farmed and wild rhino remain distinct (Knight, 2012). The main argument against rhino farming remains that natural selection is discounted from the process and the species could proceed down a domestic animal trajectory. The challenge is to make sure the wild and captive populations remain distinct, with the incentive to still conserve animals over
large landscapes in the wild.

5.9 Intensive Rhino Protection Zone
The setting up of an Intensive Rhino Protection Zone (IPZ) is an option where wild rhino range within a specific area, unfenced, and security and law enforcement staff are deployed in greater numbers to ensure higher levels of protection. This is a possibility where there are large areas to be managed resulting in security personnel being spread too thin to be effective against poaching (Emslie & Brooks, 1999).

5.10 Improved Enforcement of Security and Law
Increasing sniffer dogs at airports, improving training of customs officials, increased cooperation with international law enforcement and law enforcement agencies in the consumer countries, as well as increasing penalties and convictions for poaching are being implemented currently but the impact of this is not yet known. Poaching numbers continue to trend upwards and it seems likely that the numbers of rhino poached in South Africa (known) for the calendar year 2012, will reach over 600. The introduction of a crime awareness campaign, and better national coordination and organisation for implementation could yield improved use of resources if combined with other strategies which will ensure that the security forces are not spread too thinly. A proper assessment of law enforcement capacity at borders, customs areas, within ranges and in other critical areas, and the optimum training and redeployment of people and technology as a result, will be required. The deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force in areas where key and important populations are located would be highly constructive (WESSA, GRAA, GRU, 2012).

5.11 Other Initiatives
The President of Indonesia announced the (International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 2012) the Year of the Rhino in 2012 as the Javan and Sumatran Rhinos are on the brink of extinction. The Indonesian government has established a Rhino Task Force consisting of international and national rhino experts which will help to ensure adequate monitoring of the rhino populations and which will ensure adequate protection for the remaining animals. This will also involve improving the integrity of rhino habitats and translocation of isolated individuals to safer areas. Kenya also declared 2012 as the Year of the Rhino to attempt to raise awareness and allocation of increased resources to rhino conservation and protection (Ferreira & OkitaOuma, 2012). There is potential for a similar South African Presidential Project.
The Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT) and the Rhino Response Project (RRP) has set up a Rhino Orphanage which can accommodate, rehabilitate and restore to health orphaned calves5 and many civil society organisations and private sector firms have set up and/or support specific rhino safety initiatives.

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SECTION THREE- COMMERCE AND TRADE
7. COMMERCE- BACKGROUND
Rhino commerce includes not only trade, but hunting, farming and ecotourism, and the potential for the development of a high-value and potentially
high-value added product which can be sold on export markets.
The issue of trade has been the most controversial issue in the RIM process. While stakeholders agree on conservation goals, and accept the need for protection (differing only on issues of what kind of protection is best in what terrain and how to raise funds) the issue of whether or not trade should be permitted is an emotive one and highly polarised positions have been adopted. This phenomenon is not new, in the review of the CITES Panel of
Experts (PoE)mandated to explore the options for a future trade in elephant ivory, the same polarisation of views is notable (CITES, 2012). It seems likely that the perpetuation of this polarisation is in large part due to the lack of evidence that trade bans work, or that they do not. There are powerful opponents to trade including many global conservation organisations who believe that trade bans, as a strategy, are the only way to preserve and conserve threatened species (t’Sas-Rolfes, 1994), even in the absence of confirmatory (or otherwise) information.
Different circumstances prevail in 2012 than in the 1970’s when CITES was formally formed. The increasing sophistication and global reach of international crime syndicates is one such dynamic and the increased pressure of human settlement on the wild ranges of animals is another (Woodroffe, Thirgood & Rabinowitz, 2005; Wilkie & Carpenter, 1999; Xalxo, 2006). There are differences in the impact of these factors on different species. For example, the demand for ivory or lion bone is different from the demand for rhino horn in that the demand for rhino horn does not have to result in the death of the animal.
Banning of the rhino horn trade by CITES and the concomitant moratorium on domestic trade by South Africa has had the unintended consequence of increasing poaching of live animals as there is no other horn available. Consequently the costs of protection have increased exponentially. Because market prices for horn are high, and demand is growing and more people can afford the horn, trade has not ceased but has shifted. The attention of illegal traders has moved from buying horn domestically and moving it out ofouth African illegally, to poaching rhino domestically and moving the horn out of South Africa illegally, but in this case, leaving the animal dead (Taylor et al., 2012).
Anti-trade proponents argue that removing the ban may not result in a cessation of poaching; that it is unethical to position rhino horn as a medicinal remedy when this is not substantiated by western science; and some hold the ideological position that it is wrong to use animals for the benefit of humans. There is no evidence to suggest that the removal of the ban will or will not result in a cessation of live rhino poaching, but pragmatically if it is less costly
to acquire the horn than to poach the live animal, buyers are more likely to acquire the horn. Most regions of the world have indigenous medicinal systems to which people subscribe regardless of science and as the reaction of China to Western comments on the validity of its traditional medicine has shown, it can be seen as highly offensive to suggest that western medicine is somehow superior to indigenous medicine.
Stakeholders in the RIM process have taken one of three positions, the full commercial position, where rhino are seen as animals to be used (but treated humanely in this process); the position whereby trade should be permitted only to fund conservation; and the position whereby no trade should be permitted under any circumstances.

7.1 Elements of Commerce
7.1.1 Hunting
Hunting of white rhino in South Africa was re-introduced in 1968 and is considered to have contributed positively to biological management, the generation of revenue for conservation and increased incentives to promote effective population growth (Milliken & Shaw, 2012). The hunting and related industries are estimated to employ approximately 70 000 people in South Africa, largely in rural areas, and include trackers, professional hunters, veterinarians, and capture specialists. From 1995 to 2011, estimates are that approximately 1 300 white rhino have been legally hunted in South Africa (Milliken & Shaw, 2012). Historically, hunters were of South African, European and North American origin, but since 2003, with the resurgence in demand for rhino horn in certain Asian countries, more hunters from these areas have been seeking permits.

Organised and legal hunting is viewed by many conservationists as a useful tool in a portfolio of population management tools which has the additional advantage of raising much needed funds for the conservation of the species.
The South African hunting permitting system has however been abused by criminal private sector elements as well as corrupt public sector officials, to the detriment of the rhino . Recent abuse of the hunting system in order to acquire the horn as a “hunting trophy” and thus a legitimate export, led to South Africa introducing stricter measures, including the requirement that a person must submit proof that he / she is a bona fide hunter. South Africa furthermore requested Vietnam (Meintjies, 2011) to confirm that rhino trophies exported to Vietnam since 2010 are still in the hunters’ possession. Until an official confirmation is received from Vietnam, no further applications to hunt rhino are considered if the applicant’s country of usual residence is Vietnam (Turton, 2009). However, syndicates now simply spread applications for permits in such a way as to spread the nationality profile, as the horn is still a primary target. An improvement in the hunting permitting system is urgently needed to prevent further depredations.

7.1.2 Farming
In the view of some stakeholders, farming of rhino for horn is a non-lethal process with no negative outcomes for the species. As such, it is dissimilar to lethal farming processes such as beef farming, or other lethal harvesting processes such as the killing of bears for their bile, and the killing of elephants for their ivory. Rhino do not need to be killed for their horn. Some argue that farming will change the genetic focus of breeding, and that commercial farmers will adapt rhino to ensure a larger horn and this is quite probable over time. However, farming will not affect the genetics of wild rhino as long as the populations do not mix and should reduce motivation to poach wild rhino. Current private rhino owners firmly support a process whereby they can harvest horn and legally sell it in order to offset costs of rhino herd protection and management and there are practical opportunities for community involvement in farming processes.
Commercial game farming or game ranching involves the breeding of game for a financial return. Game farming is intensive, and the animals are kept in relatively small spaces with emphasis on production, welfare and management. Game ranching has the same focus, but the animals live in extensive and spacious environments and there is emphasis on biodiversity and eco-viability as well as production, welfare and management.
Community participation (Balepye Community, 2012; Nomtshongwana, 2012) is seen by stakeholders to be an important element of rhino conservation with the benefit of being linked to sustainable economic empowerment. Impoverished communities living within and near parks and reserves need jobs and income and are susceptible to offers of money for assistance with poaching. Such communities could be developed to farm rhino in partnership with the private sector and the Parks, resulting in a significantly improved socio-economic status for these communities. As an example, if South African rhino owners donated 4,800 rhino to the communities, and worked with the communities to increase the number at 5 per cent per annum, the communities would own 29 000 rhino by 2037. If the 4 800 rhino were to be distributed to 120 communities, at 40 rhino per community (requiring approximately 600 hectares of land) then 50 kg of horn could be harvested and sold annually.
This would represent, at current prices, an income of over US$ 2 million per annum. Clearly the same applies to commercial farmers who may choose to farm rhino (white). At an assumed price of US$ 40 000/kg, 5kg/horn set, and assuming 500 rhino poached by end December 2012, South Africa will have lost revenue of USD 40 million which, if white rhino were farmed, could have instead been used in local economies. Loon (2012) notes that if rhino are more valuable alive than dead, there will be incentive to keep them alive.
Currently there is no economic incentive for communities living close to rhino ranges to keep them alive. It is legal in South Africa to farm and ranch rhino but there is no incentive to do so as the horn is the most valuable part of the rhino, and this cannot be traded. Thus, owning rhino currently means that costs significantly outweigh benefits.

7.1.3 Trading
Demand for rhino is vested in the live animals, used for stocking other ranges, zoos, and the like, and the horn, used in traditional medicine and crafts.
Live rhino sales of surplus rhino to approved destinations generated approximately ZAR 236 million for the period 2008 to 2011 (Milliken & Shaw, 2012). This represents an important source of conservation revenue for the various conservation agencies charged with maintaining biodiversity and protecting species in South Africa.
Horns that occur due to natural deaths are required to be declared, registered and become part of the national stockpile where they are micro-chipped and loaded on the central database. More recently, some private sector owners and some public officials have been found to have concealed and sold such horns to illegal traders in defiance of South African law. This was one of the key factors which determined the implementation of a moratorium on the sale of rhino horn inside South Africa which is still in force. Illegal trade has increased dramatically since 2003 with the involvement of international and national organised crime syndicates who use globally sophisticated supply chains to focus on illegal trade in high value items (Lockwood, 2012; Taylor, Brebner, Coetzee, Davies-Mostert, Lindsey, Shaw, & t’Sas-Rolfes, 2012).
This includes drug trafficking, human trafficking and trafficking in arms. Due to a reported retail price of between US$ 40,000 and US$ 60 000/kg (Martin, 2012) per animal rhino horn has become an attractive proposition for the syndicates. This has resulted in more sophisticated and efficient poaching techniques such as the use of specific drugs and high calibre weaponry instead of the more traditional poaching approaches (Milliken & Shaw, 2012).
It has also dramatically increased the need for and the costs of protection.
The South African moratorium on domestic trade in rhino horn, acquired from dead rhino, has had the unintended consequence of shifting the attention to poaching live rhino for horn as the horn cannot be bought legally.In 1990, fourteen rhino were poached in but by 2011 this had increased to 448. From Januaryto December 2012, 633 rhino were poached and estimates suggest that the final number of poached rhino in 2012 will be over 650 (Knight, 2012). This is occurring in the context of significant increases in protection, improved law enforcement and other attempts to protect the rhino population where the arrest rate in 2012 was more than double that of 2011 and bail is now rarely allowed.The cost of increasing protection services for rhino has resulted in fewer resources available for other species, and in the face of declining government budgets for Parks and the insistence that they become more self-sustaining, a serious financial problem for many. This is not only important for State entities, but also within the private sector which holds just under 25 per cent of South Africa’s rhinos. Those struggling with huge cost increases to protect the rhino call for various forms of trade to be legalised.
State conservation agencies use the funds raised from live white rhino sales to help subsidise conservation efforts or to buy additional conservation land.
White rhino sales have been the biggest contributor to total turnover at Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (EKZNW), with game auctions, both live and catalogue, accounting for 74.9 per cent of total turnover between 2008 and 2011. The average price achieved per white rhino from EKZNW and SANParks in 2011
was just over R230 000/rhino.
The call is for trade in rhino horn as a result of natural death and trade in the stockpiles accumulated by the private and public sector owners to be permitted in order to cover the costs of maintaining the species. Further calls have been made to commercialise rhino horn and permit for the harvesting of horn from live rhino. This would have the double effect of reducing the incentive to poach a rhino with no horn this preserving the animal’s life, as well as providing an income through farming in that the horn can be harvested annually and sold as part of a legal trade system. Spin offs of this would include sustainable job creation, and a high value new export industry for South Africa. Value added activities could be implemented prior to export.
Communities which might otherwise engage in poaching support, could farm rhino for their own benefit. However, many animal rights and animal welfare organisations, some with global reach and large budgets, are anti-trade, believing that it stimulates cruelty to animals, and/or causes or contributes to the extinction of species, although there is no evidence of this for rhino.

7.1.4 Tourism
Rhino are included amongst the big five which can now only be seen in Africa. This attracts tourists who come to see wild animals in a natural range. The value of game viewing based tourism to South Africa in 2011 is not known but there is little doubt that the ability to view rhino is a constituent element of the attraction.

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8. TRADE – AGREEMENT, REGULATION AND LEGISLATION
8.1 International –CITES
CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) is an international agreement between governments. Its aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. Species are categorized into two main groupings based on how endangered they are as a species. Those specieslisted in Appendix l are threatened with extinction and trade in these is not allowed unless there are extraordinary circumstances; those listed in Appendix ll are not necessarily threatened with extinction, but there needs to be some control to ensure this does not happen. The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the senior decision making body of CITES and meets every three years.
CITES works by regulating international trade in listed in the Appendices of CITES. For these species, import, export, re-export and introduction from the sea is regulated through a permitting system. Each Party to the Convention must designate one or more Management Authorities in charge of administering that permitting system and one or more Scientific Authorities to advise them on the effects of trade on the status of the species.
CITES was drafted as a result of a resolution adopted in 1963 at a meeting of members of the IUCN and formally implemented in 1975. CITES is a voluntary international agreement and is legally binding on the Parties. It provides a framework which is then translated into the relevant domestic legislation to ensure that CITES is implemented at the national level. There are currently 176 members.

8.1.1 Rhino and CITES
Currently all black rhino are categorised as critically endangered and are listed in Appendix l of CITES, with South Africa and Namibia each permitted a hunting quota for five black rhino per annum. White rhino are categorised as threatened and are also listed in Appendix l, other than South African and Swaziland, which have annotated partial down-listings for live sales to appropriate and acceptable destinations and for the export of hunting trophies. No trade in loose horn or any other specimens of rhino, for commercial purposes, is currently allowed. In order to permit trade in rhino horn, using the standard CITES process, the following are required:
• Two thirds of the Parties (signatories to CITES) will need to agree to the proposal, and some areas, such as the EU, vote as a bloc, making it essential to have their support;
• Consultation with other range States of the species is a requirement – refer to Resolution Conf. 8.21
• Consequently, lobbying and education will be required prior to any such proposal to ensure that the reasons for the South African proposal for downlisting are well understood and appreciated;
• Any such application will need to be accompanied by reliable and valid population information as well as information pertaining to the proposed trading system and the monitoring and enforcement of this, the identification and approval of the trading partner, and a system for the application of funds raised in horn trade to conservation;
• No proposal will be considered unless a) there is a national integrated permitting and data base system in place (to confirm legal origin) and b) a full list of stockpiles with DNA referencing complete;
• The biological and trade criteria agreed by the Parties must be met for the down-listing of white rhino. No down-listing of black rhino will be permitted at this point as the species is not at the point where it will meet the criteria.
• The supporting statement from South Africa must include species and populations characteristics, status and trends, threats, utilisation and trade, review of legal and management systems and species management plans.
• If a process similar to the African elephant is followed, a CITES Panel of Experts (PoE) could then be convened to verify the information provided in the proposal with reference to the viability and sustainability of the population and threats; South Africa’s ability to monitor the population; the effectiveness of current anti-poaching measures; South Africa’s ability to control the trade and; whether law enforcement is sufficient and effective, inter alia. Subsequent to information gathering, the PoE will report to the COP and a two thirds majority vote will be needed to approve the request.
The Parties meet every three years and the next meeting is in Thailand in March 2013. At this point, South Africa is unprepared to make any submission to amend its annotation to include trade in rhino horn. However, there is provision in the CITES agreement for representations to be made by a Party for changes to the listings outside of/in the time in between, the Conferences of the Parties (COP) meetings.

8.2 NEMBA & TOPS
NEMBA is the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (10/2004) and inter alia, restricts the activities that may be carried out in respect of Threatened or Protected Species (TOPS) animals. In terms of the Act white rhino are classified as Protected and black rhino as Endangered. Specific procedures are required in terms of approving permits, and owning rhino horn. International trade in live animals to appropriate and acceptable destination and hunting trophies is permitted.
The provincial conservation authorities are responsible for the consideration of permit applications in terms of NEMBA and TOPS if the applicant is private
individual or a company. Activities involving rhino are however also regulated in terms of provincial legislation. NEMBA and TOPS allow local authorities to impose further conditions as they see fit in respect of TOPS animals. It is claimed by the private sector rhino owners that it is significantly easier permit
wise to hunt a rhino and kill it than it is to move it around in South Africa.
Stakeholders in the main do not want to see the TOPS legislation removed but would like to see amendments made to the Act and the regulations to a) render compliance less onerous for legitimate rhino owners b) permit legal domestic trade and c) change and improve the permitting system to a central online and secure system in order to guard against corruption.

8.2.1 Domestic Moratorium
The National Moratorium on Domestic Trade in Rhino horn in South Africa was implemented in 2009 and resulted in a complete ban on all domestic trade in rhino horn.There are increasing calls for the moratorium to be lifted (Fourie, 2011). Those in favour of lifting the ban include the Private Rhino Owners Association (PROA) and other representatives of the private sector, as well as members of the public sector reserves. They argue that permission to sell horn in the domestic market, while it will not lead to reductions in poaching, will a) require the development of an online permitting system impervious to corruption, b) restore confidence of private sector owners of rhino c) act as a pilot for the opening of international trade eventually, should this be undertaken and d) result in the fact tracking of chipping, DNA profiling and centralizing of horn stocks, as well as significantly improved control and identification of horn and rhino.
The suggested process is one where the moratorium is lifted but only horn which has been chipped, registered with the central data base and which is attached to a DNA profile, can be traded. This horn would be termed, TOPS REGISTERED. Once the horn has been identified, it is moved to a secure location and kept there. Subsequently paper ownership is traded and not the actual horn. The buyer will require a TOPS permit to buy the horn and ownership is registered to that person. Any person owning a horn must be able to prove the legitimate origin of that horn otherwise that person will be prosecuted under TOPS. All transaction will be certified and all horns must have a TOPS permit. This, it is argued, will simultaneously ensure that all State owned and all privately owned horns are DNA profiled and chipped and the State can trade against stockpiles immediately thus improving cash flows for conservation. Auditing horn stocks will also be significantly easier and more accurate. Most of the suggestions are catered for in TOPs currently, but the lifting of the domestic moratorium will require the Minister to repeal the prohibition. A key argument on the part of those in favour of lifting the moratorium is that it has not resulted in a decrease in poaching.
Those against the lifting of the domestic moratorium argue that it will legitimize trade, that it will result in an increase in demand over time and that it will send the wrong signals to the international community.

8.3 Impact of Trade Bans
There are no integrated quantitative data available on the impact of trade bans. Case studies have been undertaken on specific species where the available quantitative data have been used. Some relevant examples are noted below. However, it should be said that there are no directly comparable ban conditions. For example, demand for ivory and demand for canned lion hunting or lion/tiger bone, are all lethal to the animal. Demand for Bear Bile is not lethal, but can be inhumane and is economically speaking, domestic and not international trade. Demand for Rhino horn is international, and harvesting the horn is not lethal. Comparisons are therefore limited in their utility.

8.3.1 The Case of Elephant
Elephant ivory cannot be harvested without killing the elephant.
An international ban on selling ivory came into force in 1989 after poaching halved the number of elephants in Africa between 1979 and 1989, from 1.3 million to 625,000. Kenya lost 85 per cent of its elephants. Since then, the number of elephants in Africa has climbed to approximately 450,000, but an estimated 20,000 are poached annually for the black market run by international syndicates (van Aarde & Ferreira, 2009)
Following a one-off ivory sale to Japan in 1999, analysis of ETIS (the Elephant Trade Information System) a statistical database containing the world’s largest collection of elephant product seizure data, which is compiled by TRAFFIC on behalf of the CITES member countries), indicated a decline in the volume of illegal ivory trade for the next five years. However, it is not difficult to manipulate seizure statistics rendering them relatively less useful as a proxy for illegal trade. Subsequent to this auction, CITES added China to its approved buyer list for auctioned ivory. Opponents of the auction process, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EIA) view this as legitimisation of ivory trade and feared an increase in illegal trade as demand increased. Proponents argued that even with the CITES ban, elephants were still being poached to extinction in Central Africa due to the unaffordability of protecting them against well –equipped poachers and that the auction would provide funds to protect the elephant. Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe support a legal ivory trade but 19 African states signed the Accra Declaration in 2006 and 20 range states called for a total moratorium at a meeting in Kenya in 2007. Currently, CITES is investigating the possibility of trade in elephant ivory as demand in Asia has not declined and elephant are being poached in large numbers.

8.3.2 The Case of Vicuna
The vicuna (Vicugna vicugna) is similar to a small llama and lives largely in highland areas in South America. The wool of the vicuña is the finest fibre in the world and is highly sought-after in the fashion industry. Prices are very high as each animal produces approximately half a kilogram of wool per year. Jacobsen (2012) argues that there is virtually a complete parallel between the case of the vicuna and the rhino and that the vicuna model can be adapted to meet the current needs of the rhino. In both cases, the product is valuable and regrows (wool and horn), in both cases the ranges of the animals were (and are for rhino) surrounded by impoverished communities, and both species were (vicuna) and are (rhino) severely threatened by poaching.
The vicuna was nearly extinct by 1966, with only 5 000 left in the wild. In 1975, CITES imposed a trade ban on the species. In 1979, the affected range states signed a conservation convention and in the early 1980’s the private sector became involved as vicuna farming was developed in response to the demand for vicuna wool and the lifting of the CITES trade ban on vicuna wool products. By 1994, in Peru alone numbers of vicuna had increased to over 66 000 animals and in 2007, over 188 000 animals were counted.
Potential exists for the vicuna model to be applied to South African rhino and for a collaborative effort which involves the farming of the horn, with benefits to local communities an intrinsic part of the collaboration, to replace an illegal market with legal trade.

8.3.3 The Case of Rhino
Wild world rhino numbers in 2011 amounted to 28, 195 with African rhino accounting for 25, 050 of this number. 20 170 of these were white rhino and 4 880 are black rhino. In 1895, as a result of extended hunting and poaching activities there were only 50 white rhino left, all in South Africa. This has increased to current numbers as a result of careful conservation and effective protection. In the absence of such strategies, the Northern white Rhino subspecies appears to be extinct. African black rhino numbers declined from over 100 000 in the 1960’s to 2 400 in 1995 and have doubled since then to stand at 4 880 in 2011 (Emslie, 2012).
According to Emslie and Brooks (1999) and Milliken and Shaw (2012) trade in rhino horn medicines is continuing despite an almost world-wide ban on commercial international and internal trade. CITES trade bans have not succeeded in halting the rhino horn trade and the huge reduction in black rhino populations has occurred even though it is included in Appendix I, indicating that that international trade bans alone have been not been effective. Trade bans have facilitated the development of a black market for rhino horn, and encouraged the entry of illegal traders and poachers as demand, and prices, increase faster than supply. Although CITES has implemented increasingly tough measures since the first ban on Rhino trade in 1977 none of these measures has led to a reduction in the poaching of rhino horn or a reduction in illegal trade (t’Sas-Rolfes, 1990, 1995, 1997). Demand for the horn is grounded in cultural beliefs and mores and has increased as consumers have become wealthier (Lockwood, 2012; Milliken & Shaw, 2012).
The CITES trade ban in rhino horn was put in place to ensure the preservation and growth of the species. It is based on the assumptions that a) the rendering of trade in horn illegal will in and of itself reduce the motivation to trade and b) that the threat posed 35 years ago is of the same intensity and danger as the threat today. Conrad (2012) submits that policy makers were of the view then that restrictions on trade were the best policy response to commercial threats to the survival of threatened species. The CITES mechanism for limiting and prohibiting trade assumes that when a species is no longer legally tradable people will stop buying it or will switch to another commodity (Fischer, 2003, 2010). It is also assumed that consumers willing to take the risk of buying from the black market will be put off by high prices or certain and severe penalties.
However, the power of international syndicates and the capacity of developing nations to fight back against poaching have clearly demonstrated with rhino that a trade ban will not stop determined criminals, and that increasingly sophisticated and expensive protection is required. The costs of protection and the costs of managing down demand in consumer nations are not affordable for many developing nations and a different solution is required (Bennett, 2011). The CITES prohibition on trade, combined with increasing demand could have the perverse effect of further reducing wild populations instead of protecting them.

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9. SUSTAINABLE USE MODEL
Sustainable use is defined in various ways. One definition suggests that sustainable use means “using rhino assets in such a manner so as to economically sustain the populations as a result of either covering all costs associated with this and/or making profits related to rhino assets”. Another defines sustainable use as “the use of a biological resource in a way and at a rate that would not lead to the long-term decline, would not disrupt the ecological integrity of the ecosystem in which it occurs, and would ensure its continued use to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations of people”. Regardless of how it is precisely defined, the notion of sustainable use has become increasingly important in the face of major increases in costs of conservation in many states and in South Africa (Child, 2012; Draper, 2012; Emslie & Brooks, 1999).
Noting that global trade dynamics have changed but of the view that conservation models have not kept pace, Child (2012) argues for a “maximisation of the benefits of wildlife for the people on whose land the wildlife lives”. The SU model rests on four pillars, proprietorship (rights to use, sell and manage), price (humane commercial value of wildlife) subsidiarity (effective management of scale and hierarchy in institutions) and collaborative adaptive management (adaptation to change and complexity through collaborative processes). The current global philosophy of conservation strategy, based on prohibition/regulation of trade (CITES) and conservation centralised in the hands of the State, should adapt along with changed external circumstances. Trade is an intrinsic part of the new mode of conservation. Child (2012) avers that the current model emphasises national and international public interest in preventing rhino poaching,but imposes restrictions on use, thus shifting the costs of these preservationist policies to rhino owners and producers. There is no financial contribution made to the owners and producers for the costs of protection against poaching and no direct contribution in this regard is made to States by CITES or to private owners by States. Child is supported by Draper (2012) who suggests that the world should pay South Africa to protect the rhino and calls for “a fairer future that shares the burden of world heritage custodianship”.
Conrad (2012) uses the term “perfect storm” to table the notion that a concatenation of circumstances, not individual problems, can have lethal results if they co-occur. In Conrad’s view, these circumstances already exist, and hence there is danger that this will result in the extinction of the rhino as a species. While trade bans can work in the short term she argues, if perpetuated beyond their utility and in “perfect storm” circumstances, they can have the reverse outcome to what was intended. The conditions for the “perfect storm”, all of which are currently present in the case of rhino are:
• Price insensitive buyers in the market
• High commercial value
• Development of trade, legal and illegal
• Public ownership reduces incentive to protect
• Conflict for resources with humans
• Inadequate enforcement of trade bans
Eco tourism offers job creation to rural communities in rhino management and in related tourism services and products. The hunting of surplus rhino results
in improved herd and population management and revenue generation. Live sales offer the same benefits. The sale of rhino horn from natural deaths and stockpiles is a part of sustainable use and generates much needed revenues for conservation. As poaching increases, options for sustainable use decrease. Illegal hunting reduces the number of rhino available for legitimate hunters, changes the population profile, increases the costs of conservation and interferes significantly with conservation goals and objectives.

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10. RIM COMMENT
In order to be permitted to trade, under normal circumstance, South Africa would apply to the CITES COP which will occur in 2016. However, there is provision for interim application in between COPs in Article 27, Section 2. The preparation of an application will require extensive range state lobbying, education and lobbying for EU countries which tend to vote as a bloc, a strategic communications campaign and other political and practical activities. RIM recommends the re-establishment of legitimate trade in rhino horn and the preparation of an immediate application (18 months to prepare) based on:
• Banning trade in horn has not reduced poaching in the face of increased demand;
• Because rhino do not need to die for the horn to be harvested, if rhino farming is incentivised through the usual market price mechanisms, fewer rhino will die, and a sustainable economic activity which will benefit many South Africans and the South African economy, can be implemented;
• State owned horn can be sold to improve wild rhino protection, and to contribute to conservation budgets;
• South Africa should control all sales using an appropriate model and protecting against predatory buying tactics;
• South Africa should use as part of its application to CITES and as part of its lobbying process, the first econometric “Rhinonomics” model;
• South Africa should remove the moratorium on domestic trade. All traded horn must be registered, chipped and DNA profiled before a TOPS REGISTRATION certificate will be issued. Once the horn has been sold once, it moves to a secure facility and thereafter only the paper will be traded;
• Demand side management strategies should be agreed with consuming nations.
In the shorter term, protection activities should be improved and prioritised according to Key and Important population ratings. A central rhino unit should be supported with key and important population based distribution nationally.
All black rhino and all key and important white rhino populations should be subject to a dehorning programme with immediate effect and as many other
rhino populations should be dehorned as can be afforded. This is extremely costly but this exercise will demonstrate South African commitment to the
preservation of the species. The horn stub will still have value and therefore poaching will still occur but to a lesser extent. Rhino do not need their horns for social, biological or protective reasons.

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11. SUMMARY FINDINGS OF RHINONOMICS ECONOMETRIC MODEL
There are no econometric models on the supply/demand dynamics of rhino horn trade which would assist in informing the debate on the likely outcomes of various trade options. For this reason, the RIM commissioned the development of an econometric model to begin the process of scenario building and evaluation on the matter of trade. Even though full data on demand and price are not readily available, even by proxy, the model is able to assess “what if” for various possible data and allows us to assess the impact of various decisions at various levels of impact. Over time, as more accurate data become available on price and demand levels, the model’s ability to predict outcomes will become more precise and stable.
There are a number of factors that are relevant to the understanding of the rhino market that should be noted at the outset. There is a market for rhino products. This is implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by all parties to the debate, and has a number of implications.
• The fact that this market is – for the most part - illegal under CITES does not mean that it does not exist. Clearly, declaring the trade in rhino products “illegal” has not closed the market down.
• An illegal market may have some unique characteristics, but dynamically it still behaves in much the same way as a legal one. A product’s illegal status
does not negate the laws of supply and demand. It does, however, make it harder to analyse and study a market when the product concerned cannot be legally traded, because the information flows relating to incentives and behaviour are not as easy to determine.
• From the perspective of the participants in the market (suppliers and consumers) there is probably little about rhino products that is innately different from many other products: it can be supplied profitably; and it satisfies particular wants or needs.
A functioning market is, by its very nature, a dynamic entity that is subject to continual change. It is simply not possible to know everything about a market and to be able to predict with certainty how it will respond to different developments. This is as relevant to an illegal market as it is to a legal one. The market for rhino products is closely related to the market for rhinos themselves. Rhinos have value to different stakeholders for different reasons. These can range from the “value” of their role in biodiversity, the net tourism earnings they are able to deliver over their lifetime, the value that can be extracted as a result of their death (whether natural or unnatural), the medicinal effects they supposedly impart to consumers, the potential for profit to different elements of the supply chain of rhino products, and the potential for speculative profits to be earned from both live rhino and rhino products – amongst others. The prices that “consumers” of live rhino and rhino products are prepared to pay are directly linked to their perceived value. The following conclusions can be drawn from the modeling analysis:
• In the absence of any successful major initiatives or interventions, demand for rhino horn will continue to increase in years to come as a result of income
and population growth in the current major consumer markets of China and Vietnam. This will support on-going increases in market prices (possibly to in excess of $100,000/kg by 2017) as well as increases in the number of rhino that are poached each year. It carries the added risk that the increased profitability that the higher prices give rise to will encourage the entry of further criminal syndicates into the market, and the possible expansion of demand into new market areas.
• In order to even begin to reduce the numbers of rhino poached each year, anti-poaching efforts would need to reduce supply by around 33 per cent of current levels – given the natural growth in demand anticipated. However, on their own, the success of such initiatives would serve to continue to push
up the price of rhino horn, possibly making it relatively more profitable to supply. There is therefore little likelihood that criminal syndicates will permanently leave the market if this remains the only element of the strategy.
• Effective demand-reduction must be part of a long term strategy if the objective is to reduce the market price and offset the demand growth anticipated as a result of income and population growth. Such efforts may need to target potential new consumer markets as well as existing ones, so as to pre-empt simple displacement. Measures that cause consumers to question the medicinal (and other) effects of rhino horn are likely to be the most effective in the short-to-medium term.
• Legalisation of trade offers the potential of reducing criminal supply and consumption, of displacing illegal supply, and of expanding rhino ranges and populations – provided that legal supply is not accompanied by measures that raise its real cost substantially (as may be implicit in existing CITES trade practices).
• A fixation on avoiding contamination of legal supply with illegal supply is likely to be self-defeating. It could simply limit the potential to displace illegal supply - resulting in the increased profitability, and perpetuation, of illegal supply in a two tiered market. Legalisation of trade does, however, carry with it built in incentives for suppliers to develop market demand over the longer term, by seeking to identify new markets and uses. The difference is that when the returns on complements in production accrue to the owners of live rhino instead of to criminal syndicates, there is a built in incentive for them to support such demand on a sustainable basis.
The “product” of the criminal syndicates is their supply chain. If it is not used for moving rhino horn, it will almost inevitably be used to move other illegal
products (including other wildlife products). The factors that make South Africa (and other African countries) conducive locations for criminal syndicate operation (of which corruption is a significant part) need to be addressed effectively to protect biodiversity on the continent.
Addressing the rhino poaching problem cannot be tackled simplistically. It will require a multi-faceted approach that seeks to curb illegal supply through anti-poaching measures, while simultaneously engaging in effective demand-reduction measures. In this context, legalisation of trade offers the additional potential to reduce the price (and relative attractiveness of the market) to criminal syndicates, displace illegal supply, and promote longer term expansion of the rhino population.